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COMMENTS
Much of this activity can be traced to the direct effect of the automo-
bile on increasing crime and its side effects on urban and commercial
patterns. The law has had to evolve special rules so as to put vehicles in
their logical place in the overall pattern of the Constitution. Some of
the older law had been very successful, but newer libertarian ideas as to
the rights of the individual have brought about even greater changes in
this field. Further changes must still take place before it can truly be
said that public safety and private rights are in balance.
Eliot Landau
means more than nonconfinement in jails; it means the right to enjoy one's life uninter-
ruptedly and uninterfered with so long as the laws of the land are not violated
in any way that will not evidence probable cause of such violation. The conscientious
and tactful officer must know that these characteristics do not always exist and that
sometimes power produces harsh disregard of the rights of others and recklessness
in the exhibition of such power. Fundamental rights must not depend upon the varying
characteristics of officers." (Emphasis added.)
CHOICE OF LAW IN A PHYSICAL TORT
Assume hypothetically that a California resident, while driving through
Illinois on a trip to New York, was involved in a collision wherein his
car was struck by a truck, driven by a resi lent of New Hampshire. The
truck belonged to a Florida corporation and was on a haul to North
Dakota. The California resident sued the Florida corporation in Cali-
fornia. At this point, a question is raised before the California court as
to which state law should govern the sub:stantive rights of the parties:
that of California, the forum (lex fori) and residence of the plaintiff,
that of Florida, the place of incorporation of the defendant or that of
Illinois, the situs of the tort and the place of injury? It is the purpose of
this comment to analyze the possible legal concepts and doctrines the
California court may choose to apply in deciding this question.
Until the mid-nineteenth century the eorly common law concept to
the effect that tort actions were a part of :he law of remedies prevailed
in the United States. Under this doctrine, all causes of action sounding
in tort were governed by the law of the lex fori.' The doctrine was
applied as late as 1875, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that
,the application of the law of the lex fori to foreign torts was a rule "al-
most too familiar ... for discussion or authority."12 Following this early
line of reasoning the law that would be applied in the hypothetical prob-
1 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 357 (2d ed. 1841).
2 Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 37 Wi,. 321 (1873).
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lem presented above would be that of California. The fact that the de-
fendant was not a resident of California, and that the injury occurred in
'Illinois would not be considered.
During this same period in American history, another rule in the field
of choice of law in cases of foreign torts by the lex fori was developed
by some courts.3 Simply stated, it required the lex fori to apply the law
of the place where the legal injury was suffered in determining the
substantive rights of the parties. Early support of this lex loci delicti
(place of injury) rule is found in a passage in Justice Story's work on
Conflict of Laws which states that "the true doctrine ... proceeds upon
the broad ground of the right of action governed by the laws of the
foreign state."'4
This historical background served as the basis and foundation from
which the lex loci delicti rule developed during the first half of the
twentieth century. In 1934, the original Restatement of Conflict of Laws
adopted this rule by providing that, "The law of the place of wrong
determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury."
The present status of the lex loci delicti rule is that it represents the
overwhelming weight of authority in the United States;6 the cases which
a Holbrook v. Bowman, 62 N.H. 313 (1882); Torrance v. Third National Bank, 70
Hein. 44, 23 N.Y.S. 1073 (1893); Barclay v. Thompson, 2 Pen. & W. 148 (Pa. 1830).
4 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 845 (8th ed. 1883).
5 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).
0 Pound v. Goulding, 237 Ala. 387, 187 So. 468 (1939); Lillegraven v. Tengs, 375 P.2d
139 (Alaska 1962); Dobbins v. Martin Buick Co., 216 Ark. 861, 227 S.W.2d 620 (1950);
Gallegos v. Union-Tribune Publishing Co., 16 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1961); United States
National Bank of Denver v. Bartges, 122 Colo. 546, 224 P.2d 658 (1950); Bissonnette
v. Bissonnette, 145 Conn. 733, 142 A.2d 527 (1958); Park v. Beech Aircraft Co., 132
A.2d 54 (Del. 1957); Astor Electric Service v. Cabrera, 62 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1952);
Record Truck Lines Inc. v. Harrison, 109 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E.2d 65 (1964); Colligan
v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963); Slinkard v. Bable, 233 Ind. 680,
112 N.E.2d 876 (1953); Cardamon v. Iowa Lutheran Hospital, 128 N.W.2d 226
(Iowa 1964); Workman v. Hargadon, 345 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1961); Nicholson v.
Atlas Assurance Corp., 156 So. 2d 245 (La. 1963); Pungle v. Gibson, 135 Me. 297,
195 Atl. 695 (1937); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Stan Ross Buick Inc., 343 Mass.
622, 180 N.E.2d 88 (1962); Leebove v. Rovin, 363 Mich. 569, 111 N.W.2d 104 (1961);
Lowrey v. Dingmann, 251 Minn. 124, 86 N.W.2d 499 (1957); Russell v. Kotsch, 336
S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1961); Morin v. Letourneau, 102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131 (1960);
Marshall v. George M. Brewster & Son Inc., 37 N.J. 176, 180 A.2d 129 (1962); Farmer
v. Ferrea, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963); Mann v. Policyholders' National Life
Insurance Co., 78 N.D. 724, 51 N.W.2d 853 (1952); Nadeau v. Power Plant Engineer-
ing Co., 216 Ore. 12, 337 P.2d 313 (1959); Ewell v. Cardinal, 53 R.I. 469, 167 At. 533
(1933); Oshick v. Oshick, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Parsons v. American
Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698 (1932); C.I.T. Corp. v. Geary, 170
Va. 16, 195 S.E. 651 (1938); Maag v. Voykovich, 46 Wash. 2d 302, 280 P.2d 680 (1955);
Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1937); Hamschild v. Continental
Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269
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have supported it involving most every type of tort cause of action. Its
one great advantage is that of simplicity cf application. Given any type
of tortious injury, all the court or attorney need do is determine where
the legal injury was incurred and the law of that state will be applied
in determining the substantive rights of the parties. Of course the other
advantage which flows from this simplicity of application is the uni-
formity of result achieved, especially where all the states follow the
same rule.
Ironically the rule's greatest advantage has also become its greatest
disadvantage. Severe criticism has been directed toward the application
of this rule by legal scholars over the past :everal decades.7 Their general
criticism is that the rule has been applied toc automatically or axiomatically
by the courts. That, given any set of facts in which a foreign tort had
occurred, the forum would automatically and without apparent reflection
of the particular situation of the parties, apply the substantive law of
the situs of the tort. In essence they argue that application of this rule,
which is based upon a "vested rights" theory, cannot solve the complex
problems which arise in modern litigation, and may often yield harsh
and unjust results.s Professor Stumberg s:tates that the choice of law
problem in the field of foreign torts should be approached from a point
of view relating to the social policy of the forum or local rules of
law. This, he argues, will lead to more desirable results than those achieved
by an automatic reference to the situs of the tort, especially where the
problems involved have no direct connection to' that place.9 By this he
seems to imply that in certain cases the place where the injuries were
suffered may only be an incidental factor to be considered in the par-
'ticular cause of action before the court. Several recent cases which have
followed to some degree this line of reasoning will be discussed below.
It seems that there is a significant degree of feeling among legal scholars,
P.2d 302 (1954). See also Herr v. Holohan, 131 F. Supp. 777 (D.Md. 1955) where the
federal court followed the original Restatement because Maryland had no reported
decisions in this area. Other decisions by federal courts, Adams v. Greeson, 300 F.2d
555 (10th Cir. 1962); Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chemical Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (D.Texas
1963); W. W. Clyde & Co., v. Dyers, 126 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1942) cert. denied, 317
U.S. 638 (1942).
7 See generally Cavers, A Critique of the Cboice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173 (1933); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 959
(1952); Currie in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Con-
flict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1233 (1963;; Harper, Policy Bases of the Con-
flict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155
(1947); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1951); Traynor,
Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TXAs L. REV. 657 (1959).
8 See Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
9 STUMBER, Coivucr OF LAWS 198-212 (3rd ed. 1963).
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interested in the choice of law problem, to the effect that there should
be a breakaway from the strict, axiomatic application of the lex loci
delicti rule and the adoption of more flexible rules based upon a policy
analysis by the court in each case.' 0 They advocate that the place of
injury should be considered just one of several factors which the court
must consider in determining the law to be applied.
It should not be inferred from the above discussion that the courts
have applied the lex loci delicti rule in every foreign tort action without
reference to or consideration of other factors. Cases have been decided
in this field which either do not directly discuss the place of injury rule,
or while paying lip service to the rule, decide that in the particular case
other factors outweigh application of the rule. Before looking at several
of the more recent decisions that have not strictly applied the lex foci
delicti rule, it should be made clear that they do not specifically repudiate
the place of injury rule. While they just seem to "side step" application
of the rule in the particular case, they are nevertheless important since
they do mark a "breakaway" from the automatic application of the lex
loci delicti rule.
The case of Gordon v. Parker" involved an action by a Pennsylvania
husband in a Massachusetts federal court against a Massachusetts resident,
in which he alleged alienation of his wife's affections in Massachusetts.
This cause of action had previously been abolished in Pennsylvania,
the matrimonial domicile and the apparent place of injury; however,
Massachusetts allowed this action. If the court had strictly applied the
lex loci delicti rule, the plaintiff's action would have been barred since
he could not have maintained the action in Pennsylvania, the place where
the legal injury was suffered. However, because of the nature of the
cause of action the court, rather than discussing where the injury oc-
curred, weighed the interests of the two states in the outcome of the
litigation. The court noted that "this is not a situation in which the
interests of Pennsylvania plainly outweigh those of Massachusetts.' 12
While Pennsylvania as the matrimonial domicile was concerned with
the conduct of its domiciliaries, Massachusetts, as the place of the alleged
misconduct and the place of the defendant's residence, was also interested.
Massachusetts did have an interest with regard to the "conduct within
10 See articles supra note 7. See also Cheatham in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1229 (1963); Leflar in Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, Id at
1247 (1963); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-
Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963).
1183 F. Supp. 40 (D.Mass. 1949).
121d at 42.
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her borders which in her view lowers the standards of the community
where they occur."'31 The court therefore avoided application of the
lex loci delicti rule by determining that, in this case, the interests of
Massachusetts outweighed those of Pennsylvania, and that Massachusetts
law should be applied.
In Grant v. McAuliffe, 14 a collision occurred in Arizona between two
California automobiles driven by California residents. The defendant's
decedent, who was the driver of one of the automobiles, died as a result
of the crash, and suit was brought by the passengers and driver of the
other automobile. Arizona law bars actions brought after the death of
an alleged tort-feasor, while California does not. The Supreme Court of
California avoided application of the lex loci delicti rule by characteriz-
ing the question of survival as part of the administration of decedent's
estates in California and therefore procedural, and governed by the law
of the lex fori.
In Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc.,15 the defendant sold liquor in Minne-
sota to an intoxicated person whose automobile was later involved in a
collision with another Minnesota automobile in Wisconsin. No liability
to the defendant would have resulted if the law of Wisconsin, the situs
of the tort, was applied, however under the Minnesota "dram shop"
statute and Civil Damage Act, the defendant was held liable by that
state for his illegal sale. Since the defendant's liability was fixed by the
illegal sale, the fact that the injury occurred in another state was imma-
terial. The court chose to avoid the application of the lex loci delicti rule
on the basis that the forum's interests in punishing violations of its liquor
laws, and in providing an injured party with a remedy, must override
the application of the place of injury rule. The fact that the injury oc-
curred in Wisconsin was not considered of controlling import.
Hamschild v. Continental Casualty Co.16 is another decision which
sidestepped the policy of strict application of the place of injury rule.
In this case, a Wisconsin husband and wife were involved in an auto-
mobile accident in California as a result of which the wife was injured.
Suit by the wife against her husband was brought in Wisconsin. The
Wisconsin court was confronted with the problem of interspousal im-
munity in the field of Conflict of Laws. California, the place of injury,
bars suits between spouses in tort, while Wisconsin, the forum and
domicile of the parties does not. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held
that the laws of the place of injury should not control in determining
the capacity of one spouse to sue the other. Rather, the court specifically
13 Ibid. 15 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
1441 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). 167 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
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stated that the law to be applied in determining capacity is that of the
state of domicile, because it is more interested in suits between spouses
than is the state where the injury occurred. The court clearly stated that
the decision in the instant case was not to be considered a rejection of
the lex loci delicti rule, which under ordinary circumstances will still
govern the rights of the parties.
The last case to be noted in which the court, due to the particular
factual situation, avoided the effect which would have resulted from
application of the place of injury rule is Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines
Inc."7 In that case, a New York resident was killed when the plane in
which he was a passenger crashed in Massachusetts. Suit was brought
in New York for negligent breach of the contract of carriage. Massa-
chusetts, the situs of the tort, limits the amount of damages recoverable
in this type of action, while the forum, New York, places no such limi-
tation on the amount of recovery. Since there were no prior New York
decisions in point, the court of appeals was faced with the problem of
characterizing the question of damages as being either a procedural mat-
ter or a substantive right. By choosing to characterize the problem of
the amount of damages recoverable as a procedural or remedial right,
and therefore governed by the law of the lex fori, the court of appeals in-
directly avoided the effect of the lex loci delicti rule. If the court had
characterized the question of damages as substantive, then, as the court
at that time followed the place of injury rule, it would have been com-
pelled to apply Massachusetts law as to damages, because under the
place of injury rule substantive rights of the parties must be determined
by the law of the lex loci delicti.
These cases represent what Professor Stumberg was referring to when
he stated that in various situations the mere fact that the injury occurred
in one state should not be a compelling reason for applying the law of
that state. Referring to the hypothetical presented in the beginning of
the comment, by strictly applying the lex loci delicti rule, the California
court would be required to apply the law of Illinois in determining the
substantive rights of the parties. In that factual situation, it would be
fairly difficult for the court to side-step the application of the rule unless
the law of Illinois for some reason would yield a result substantially
dissimilar to that of the forum, and which the forum could determine
was unfair and unjust.
In summary, prior to 1963 five states, 18 while not specifically repudiat-
ing the lex loci delicti rule, had expressed a willingness to break away
17 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
18 California, Massachusetts (federal court), Minnesota, New York and Wisconsin.
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from automatic application of the rule in given factual situations; mainly
where the court decided that the forum had a greater interest in the
ultimate outcome of the case than did the sta.te where the injury occurred.19
The question is then raised: have any courts expressly abandoned the
lex loci delicti rule, and if so, what other rules have they adopted? Prior
to 1963, this question would have had to be answered in the negative.
In that year, the case of Babcock v. Jackson20 was decided in New York.
In this suit, a New York resident, who was a guest in a New York
automobile, was injured in an accident t'iat occurred in Ontario. The
law of Ontario denies recovery by a guest from the owner of an auto-
mobile. The New York court specifically rejected the lex loci delicti rule,
concluding that its application operated in a manner contrary to the
interests of the other interested jurisdictions, and that its application often
yielded unjust results. The court adopted t. rule which held that "justice,
fairness and the best practical result ... may best be achieved by giving
controlling effect to the law of the juri;diction which because of its
relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the greatest
concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation. ' 2'
One year after the Babcock case was dccided, Griffith v. United Air-
lines, Inc.22 was decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The
decedent in that case, a Pennsylvania resident, purchased an airline ticket
in Philadelphia for a flight to Phoenix, Arizona. The plane crashed while
landing in Denver, Colorado, and the decedent was killed. The executor
of his estate brought an action against the airline in Pennsylvania for
negligent breach of the contract of carriage. Under the law of Colorado,
the situs of the tort, the amount of recovery is greatly limited, but Penn-
sylvania allows a more liberal recovery. The court thoroughly analyzed
the history of the lex loci delicti rule and its own recent decisions sup-
porting the rule. 23 It then went on to specifically repudiate the place
of injury rule stating "we are of the opinion that the strict lex loci delicti
rule should be abandoned in favor of a more flexible rule which permits
analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before
19 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 198-212 (3rd. ed. 1963).
20 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). See also Lowe's North
Wilkesboro Hardware Inc. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co., 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.
1963) which adopted the law of the state that had "the most significant relationships
with events constituting the alleged tort and with the parties." Id. at 473,
21 Id. at 481, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 283.
22 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
23 The most recent of which was Vant v. Gish, 412 Pa. 359, 365, 194 A.2d 522, 526
(1963).
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the court. '24 It determined that Pennsylvania's interest in this particular
litigation was greater than that of Colorado where the injury occurred
and that, therefore, the law of Pennsylvania should determine the measure
of damages. The court cited the Babcock case and its determination that
the law of the place most intimately concerned with the outcome of the
litigation should be applied. 25
Before looking to some of the reasons given for the departure from the
place of injury rule, the position of the proposed new Restatement of
Conflict of Laws should be noted.26 The Restatement now provides that
foreign torts should be governed by the local law of the state which has
the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties, 27
although separate rules are to be applied to different types of torts. Those
contacts that are to be considered most vital in determining the state of
most significant relationship include the place of conduct, the place of
injury and the domicile of the parties. If we apply the rules adopted by
the Restatement and by the Babcock case and the Griffith case to the
hypothetical presented in the beginning of this comment, the California
court might well determine that the lex fori has the greatest interest in
the outcome of the litigation, since one of its residents, the plaintiff, had
been injured. Therefore, California law rather than Illinois law (the
place of injury) could be applied. The Babcock and Griffith cases seem to
have adopted the doctrine that the law to be applied should be that of
the state having the most significant contacts or relationships with the
particular issues involved in the litigation.28
Another view adopted by some authors would place greater emphasis
on the law of the forum. 29 The forum should apply its own law unless
it finds some compelling reason to apply the laws of another jurisdiction. 30
With the emergence of this line of thinking, it is noted that the theories
advocated in choice of law problems in the field of foreign torts have
made a complete circle. It should be remembered that the early common
law also was to the effect that the law of the lex fori governed determina-
tion of foreign tort problems.
24 Supra note 22, at -- , 203 A.2d at 805.
25 Supra note 22.
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 supra (Tentative Draft No. 9
1964).
27 See note 26, § 379a, to the effect that the new Restatement possibly still retains
the lex loci delicti rule with regard to personal injury cases.
28 See op. cit. supra notes 7 and 10. See also Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant
Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PR101. 700 (1963).
29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.
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There is little doubt that most of the new doctrines, to various degrees,
allow the one thing that the strict application of the lex loci delicti rule
specifically avoided-that of forum shopping. Under the place of injury
rule as strictly applied, it did not matter where the case was brought
since the substantive law to be applied would be the law of the place of
occurrence of the tort. Most authors who have criticized the lex loci
delicti rule and advocated the adoption of the rules discussed above do
not discuss the possible drawbacks of a policy allowing a potential plain-
tiff to shop for the forum whose laws are most favorable to him.31 It
would seem, however, that this is an important factor, to be considered
before any court abandons the place of injury rule.
The reasoning advanced for breaking away from the lex loci delicti
rule and the adoption of a form of the "most significant relationship"
doctrine was stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the
Griffith case:
It must be emphasized that this approach to choice of law will not be chaotic
and anti-rational. "The alternative to a hard and fast system of doctrinal
formulae is not anarchy. The difference is not between a system which purports
to have, but lacks, complete logical symmetry and one which affords latitude
for the interplay and clash of conflicting policy factors. '3 2
The court further reasoned that although adherence to the principle
of stare decisis is generally a wise course of judicial action, where a rule
does not adequately serve the best interests of justice it should not be
followed merely to adhere to stare decisis.8 The court then cited Cardozo
to the effect that:
When a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to
be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should
be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.3 4
This reasoning, advanced in the most recent case to abandon the place
of injury rule, clearly leaves an open do~or through which other states
may follow. In addition to the Babcock and Griffith decisions which have
specifically abolished the lex loci delicti rule in their respective states,3 5
there have been five cases, discussed above, which have "avoided" the
strict application of the rule.36 Whether other states will elect to follow
these decisions only time will tell.
Floyd Krause
31 See generally supra notes 7, 10 and 28.
32 Supra note 22, at -- , 203 A.2d at 806. 33 Ibid.
34 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 150-51 (1921).
5 5New York and Pennsylvania. 36See supra note 18.
